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MUST SPEECH BE SPECIAL? 
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Frederick Schauer* 
Academic and judicial thinking about freedom of speech seems to 
have entered a new phase, one that might be called the "reemergence 
of theory." We are now experiencing an attention to the underlying 
premises of the principle of freedom of speech that is both more con-
scious and more sustained than at any time in the past. In order to 
explain this development, it is necessary to take a brief look at the 
phases that have preceded the current one. Obviously these phases 
overlap, and my characterizations represent rough generalizations 
rather than inviolate truths. Indeed, any such characterization is little 
more than the identification of one interesting feature from among a 
morass of interconnected similarities and differences. Thus, like most 
attempts to put the phenomena of the world into large generalizations, 
drawing these distinctions says much more about the draftsman than 
about the world. I plead guilty to the charge, but the contrasts seem 
nevertheless worthy of exploration. 
From 1919 until about twenty years ago, discussion about freedom 
of speech in the context of the first amendment took place largely in the 
"How much?" mode. The courts and first amendment theorists com-
monly acknowledged, as Holmes put it, that the first amendment was 
not "intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." 1 
Thus, the various exceptions to the coverage2 of the first amendment-
* Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Visiting Professor of Law (1983-
1984), University of Michigan. A.B., M.B.A., Dartmouth College; J.D., Harvard University. Al-
though this Article deals with a theme similar to that of the Review Essay by Professors Alexander 
and Horton that appears in this issue, Alexander & Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech 
Principle, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1319 (1983), I had not seen their review when this Article was written. 
I plan to respond to Professors Alexander and Horton at some later date. 
I Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
2 I use the word "coverage" to refer to those activities the regulation of which is to be mea-
sured against the standards of the first amendment. It is quite possible that certain conduct, even 
when measured against the standards of the first amendment, will remain unprotected. Yet the 
distinction between coverage and protection is designed to point out that there is a big difference 
between those activities (some of which are verbal) that have nothing to do with the first amend-
ment, and those that at least require that governmental action be tested against relatively stringent 
first amendment standards. I have dealt with this distinction at great length elsewhere. F. 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92, 134-35 (1982); Schauer, Can Rights 
Be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225 (1981); Schauer, "Private" Speech and the 'Private" Forum: Givhan v. 
Western Line School District, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 217, 227-29 [hereinafter cited as Schauer, Private 
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commercial advertising,3 defamation,4 obscenity,5 and fighting 
words6-were rarely called into serious question. Moreover, even with 
respect to political and other speech that the first amendment plainly 
covered, the battle lines were narrowly drawn. No one doubted that 
free speech was a good thing, at least in the abstract, and consequently 
there was little concern for why free speech was valued. Instead the 
problems centered around the weight to be given freedom of speech 
when it conflicted with other universally acknowledged values, most 
commonly national security and public order.7 Although in retrospect 
it seems that this debate could have been illuminated by closer atten-
tion to the philosophical foundations of the principles of free speech, 
that was not the course taken. Rather, the tired metaphors of the mar-
ketplace of ideas and the search for truth served as stage props for a 
debate over how much the values of free speech would have to yield in 
the face of exigent public concerns. 8 
This is not to say that the issues present in this phase were easy. 
On the contrary, the judicial and academic divisions during this period 
of growth of free speech doctrine-roughly from 1919 to the mid-
1960's-were as sharp as they have ever been.9 But the combatants 
Speech]; Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 
265, 267-82 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Schauer, Categories]. 
3 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
4 Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
S Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
6 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
7 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941). 
8 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
9 Many of these debates took place between the so-called "absolutists" and the so-called 
"balancers." E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Men-
delsohn, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 
(1962); Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Se!f-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. 
REv. 4 (1961). 
I suppose that characterizing an enormously complex range of issues in terms of a simple 
dichotomy between balancing and absolutism served a purpose in its time, but it has had the 
unfortunate consequence of continuing to channel debate about important first amendment issues 
into a preconceived mold of balancing versus absolutism, even among those who ought to know 
better. E.g., Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and 
Manner Regulations, 18 Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (1983); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic 
Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983). 
For example, the simple designation of "balancing" masks questions about who should weigh 
competing values, the extent to which balancing should take place in more or less rigid rules or in 
the circumstances of the individual case (and that is a continuum and not a dichotomy), and the 
level of abstraction at which the competing values should be described and weighed. Similarly, 
absolutism may be taken to entail a narrowly circumscribed first amendment within which direct 
restrictions are prohibited, or it may be taken instead as a desire to formulate specific first amend-
ment rules of adjudication that grant little if any power to the judge in the individual case to 
examine the state's particular reasons for restricting in that case, or to examine the extent to which 
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seemed relatively unconcerned with the deeper meaning of free speech. 
First amendment partisans took it as a given that maximum protection 
of free speech was a good thing, 10 and devoted their efforts to arguing 
that the perceived dangers of speech were not nearly as great as was 
often assumed. And those who were wary of excess protection of 
speech were similarly unconcerned with the deep theory of the first 
amendment. They saw no reason to doubt the value of free speech in 
the abstract, but were unwilling in real cases to sacrifice many of their 
fears about dangers to security, order, and the stability of the state. 11 
The 1960's and 1970's brought a new phase to free speech theory, a 
phase that substituted for the question "How much?" the seemingly 
simpler question of "How?" This was, of course, a period of intense 
solicitude for individual rights, and free speech was no exception. 
There was no call to examine the reasons for accepting the principle of 
free speech, for everyone agreed without question that maximum free-
dom of speech (and most other things as well) was desirable. As a 
result, most disputes focused on the strategies for achieving maximum 
protection. 12 This search for how to attain optimal free speech protec-
tion pervaded not only the academic commentary, but the work of the 
courts as well. For it was during this phase that those studying the first 
amendment witnessed the judicial creation of the various devices that 
have now become acknowledged weapons in the first amendment arse-
nal-vagueness, 13 overbreadth, 14 the chilling effect, 15 special proce-
a particular speaker or speech is important in light of the principles of freedom of speech. This 
latter version of absolutism, focusing on restricting judicial power, is implicit in Baker's argument, 
and is quite different from the former version, which partially characterizes Meiklejohn's special 
concern with restricting legislative power. 
That an absolutist-balancer dichotomy obscures important problems and variations is only 
part of the problem. Equally troublesome is the extent to which language from a former and 
largely different war is used to describe the battles of today. The language has acquired so much 
baggage from its previous usage that it blocks us from appreciating the ways in which today is 
different from yesterday. q. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897) 
(deploring the confusion caused when terms with ethical associations are used in legal discourse). 
10 Indeed, for some the refusal to consider first principles was part of a belief that the first 
amendment itself had already resolved the question. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 
U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
11 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Feiner v. 
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of 
Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REv. 539 (1920). The tendency to accentuate 
dangers is somewhat related to another problem, that of being most willing to support freedom of 
speech as long as it takes place Somewhere Else. This view is not surprising, for in most of the 
interesting free speech disputes of recent times the litigants have been quite unpleasant people 
carrying equally unpleasant messages. See Schauer, Cod!fYing the First Amendment: New York v. 
Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 286-87, 315-16. 
12 E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Kalven, "Uninhibited, 
Robust, and Wide-Open"-A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289 
(1968); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel 
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968). 
13 E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 
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dural protection, 16 and many others. With free speech once again 
taken as a given in this search for methods of protecting it, there was, as 
in the previous phase, little occasion for concentrated attention on the 
''Why?" rather than the "How?" or the "How much?" of the first 
amendment. 
From the foregoing two phases, a first amendment emerged that 
was, at its core, quite strong. Although perhaps it was not strong 
enough to satisfy those who exalt free speech above all other values, 
there is little doubt that Brandenburg v. Ohio, 11 New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,18 and Cohen v. Cal!fornia 19 represent a profound commitment 
to virtually unlimited discussion of political, moral, and social ques-
tions of all types.20 Moreover, this strong core was well guarded by a 
host of procedural and subsidiary doctrines that seem to make it rela-
tively safe from erosion. 
From this secure core, arguments in the current phase of free 
speech theory have centered around the broadening of the first amend-
ment. The most prominent example of the broadening of the first 
amendment is of course commercial advertising,21 but the same phe-
nomenon exists with respect to campaign contributions,22 speech by 
public employees during working hours,23 nude dancing,24 and the 
choice by government of the books or entertainment that it will offer in 
(1967). The vagueness doctrine, of course, is of rather more ancient lineage, e.g., Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), thus making it an especially available tool somewhat later. 
14 E.g., Zwickler v. Keota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flowers, 377 U.S. 
288 (1964). 
15 E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 
(1965). 
16 E.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (burden of proof); Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (burden of proof; promptness; availability of appeal); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (burden of proof). 
17 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg's strength is best appreciated if assessed in 
light of Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
18 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
19 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
20 The clearest indicator of the strength of the core of the first amendment today is the ease 
with which the Supreme Court has overturned content-based restrictions of speech that are related 
to public issues. E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Consolidated 
Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). Indeed, the importance of discussion of "matters of public concern" is 
underscored by the Court's recent protection of the right to discuss those matters by an employe~; 
on a government employer's premises and time. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). 
21 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). On 
what counts as commercial speech, see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 
(1983). 
22 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
23 Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). See also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
24 Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 
(1975). 
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its facilities.25 In each of these areas, recent developments have made 
first amendment considerations applicable to issues that in the recent 
past were considered well without the boundaries of the first amend-
ment. Moreover, for every instance of judicial broadening of the first 
amendment, there seem to be at least ten attempts in the academic liter-
ature to have the first amendment swallow up one more segment of 
society or of governmental action. 26 
With this process of broadening, or at least arguing about broad-
ening, has come the reemergence of theory. For although the accepted 
assumptions, traditional metaphors, and standard platitudes about the 
value of free speech might have been largely sufficient to deal with the 
issues of the past, they are clearly inadequate to confront the questions 
we must ask when trying to determine the extent to which, if at all, the 
courts should broaden the coverage of the first amendment to encom-
pass a wide range of activities seemingly so far from the comprehension 
of the classical free speech theorists that the relevance of classical the-
ory has become attenuated. In the place of the classical theories have 
come new attempts to ask about the "Why?" of the first amendment, in 
the hope of developing a theory that will explain the values that the 
concept of free speech is designed to serve. With such a theory in 
place, of course, it becomes much easier to confront the questions 
raised by the broadening of the first amendment. For if we know why 
we have the principles of free speech, then we can determine in the new 
case whether that class of activities is the type that the first amendment 
is designed to promote. 
Would that it be so easy! The problem, of course, is that there are 
numerous candidates for the appropriate underlying theory of the free 
speech and free press clauses of the first amendment. Indeed, the con-
centration in this Symposium on deep theory, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, is strong evidence of the way that debate about freedom of 
speech has shifted. In order to shed some light on the debate about the 
philosophical/sociological/political/historical foundations of free 
speech, it seems appropriate to set some ground rules, or at least some 
standards that an adequate theory must satisfy. Surprisingly, hardly 
any attention has been devoted to this task.27 On second thought, it 
probably is not so surprising. Almost everyone would prefer being the 
star quarterback to being the referee or a member of the rules commit-
25 Board ofEduc., Island Trees Free Union School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality 
opinion); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
26 E.g., Kamenshine, 17ze First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. 
L. Rev. 1104 (1979); Morgan, 17ze Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
297 (1982). See also the fascinating analysis of sleeping as speech in Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
27 The most notable exception is Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U.L. 
Rev. 237 (1978). 
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tee. Yet if there were no rules, and no referees, there would be no star 
quarterbacks, so someone has to do the job, and that is part of what I 
want to accomplish here. But it is also too large a task to complete in 
this forum, so I want to concentrate on only part of it. I want to deal 
with the question of whether, and if so to what extent, an adequate 
theory of free speech must explain the way in which the activities en-
compassed by the first amendment are importantly distinct from activi-
ties that do not receive such uniquely cherished protection. In other 
words, must speech be special? 
I 
In asking whether speech is or must be special, we must start by 
clarifying the nature of the question. That is, no one could plausibly 
claim that the activities covered by the first amendment share no char-
acteristics whatsoever with activities not covered by the first amend-
ment. Rather, the claim I want to consider is more modest. Do the 
activities covered by the first amendment28 possess at least one and 
maybe more theoretically relevant differences from those activities not 
so covered? If they do, then we can say that the activities covered by 
the first amendment are in some sense special. But if they do not-if 
they are an analytically indistinguishable subset of a larger category, 
not all of which is protected by the first amendment-then we can say 
that speech is not special. 
The question of whether speech is special has a descriptive side 
and a normative side. On the descriptive side, the question is whether 
one can identify relevant differences between speech and activities not 
covered by the first amendment. But on the normative side, the ques-
tion is whether such a difference is necessary for a satisfactory underly-
ing theory of the first amendment. For it is by no means inconceivable, 
and indeed may very well be the case, that what is analytically neces-
sary for a satisfactory theory of the first amendment is unattainable 
given the existing state of the world. Yet that is getting ahead of things. 
For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the question "Must speech 
be special?" is analytically distinct from the question "Is speech 
special?". 
In dealing with these issues, I want to discuss one particular strand 
of free speech theory that presents the problems most starkly. This 
strand I will call the "self-development" theory, and I use that designa-
tion precisely because it is different from the titles of the various theo-
ries that I believe comprise it. I mean to include within the category 
28 Whether the "activities covered by the first amendment" are all "speech" in a non-technical 
sense is a crucially important question, but not germane to the instant discussion. The reader may 
assume that "activities covered by the first amendment" and "speech" in a technical sense are here 
used synonymously. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity'~· An Exercise 
in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 61 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979). 
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those theories relying variously on self-realization,29 self-fulfillment,30 
self-expression,31 and variants on the individual liberty core of all of 
these theories. Conversely, I mean to exclude from the category the 
leading consequentialist justifications for a principle of freedom of 
speech, including most prominently th~ search for truth/marketplace 
of ideas theories, 32 the popular sovereignty I democratic process theo-
ries, 33 and the distrust of government theories. 34 
There are important differences among the various theories that 
are components of the self-development strand of first amendment the-
ory, and I do not want to suggest that they are little more than minor 
variations of each other. For present purposes, however, they do share 
significant similarities. One is that they are all based on the value to 
the individual of a regime in which free speech flourishes, and that this 
value to the individual is taken as an end in itself. These theories, 
therefore, although perhaps consequentialist with respect to the indi-
vidual, are not premised on the value to society of permitting free 
speech. Rather the focus is on what free speech can do for the individ-
ual, either as speaker,35 or as listener,36 or both. 
But the most striking feature of all of these self-development theo-
ries is that they identify as the value underlying the principle of free-
dom of speech a value that is not peculiar to speech. In every variant at 
issue the value that self-development theorists urge is a value that can 
undoubtedly be promoted by speech. Nevertheless, that same value can 
also be promoted by other activities that do not involve communica-
tion, and self-development theorists offer no particular reason why 
29 E.g., Redish, The Value o/ Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Redish, Free Speech]; Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Red-
ish's The Value o/ Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982); Redish, Self-Realization, Democ-
racy, and Freedom o/ Expression: A Reply to Proftssor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982). 
30 E.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 6-7; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578-
79 (1978). 
31 For a fuller description and critique of this whole range oftheones, see F. ScHAUER, supra 
note 2, at 47-67. 
32 E.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 268-304 
(M. Lerner ed. 1961); J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (J.C. Suffolk ed. 1968). The leading judicial 
embodiments are Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
IBEW Local501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34,40 (2d Cir. 1950), qff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) (L. Hand, J.). 
33 E.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); 
BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits o/ 
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). See also H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(1966); M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRES-
SION IN AMERICA (1983). 
34 E.g., F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 73-86; Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment 
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521. 
35 E.g., Baker, supra note 29; Baker, Scope o/ the First Amendment Freedom o/ Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978). 
36 E.g., Redish, supra note 29. 
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communicative activities can serve the goal more completely or more 
frequently than other activities that are not in any significant sense 
communicative. 37 
I want to illustrate this point from two different perspectives. 
First, we can look at those theories emphasizing in some way or an-
other the self-expressive aspects of communicating.38 Each of these 
theories relies on the fact that expressing one's self is an important 
component of individual liberty, and if we do not allow channels of 
self-expression then we will suffer accordingly. Now this is of course 
true, but the question is whether communicating serves any particularly 
special function in terms of self-expression. 39 I can also express myself 
in my attire, my occupation, my sexual activity and preferences, my 
residence, my hobbies and other recreations, and so on. The list is vir-
tually endless, and that is exactly the point. Communicating is obvi-
ously a form of self-expression, but it is by no means the only form of 
self-expression, and it is by no means the form of self-expression that is 
most important to everyone. Thus, the argument from self-expression 
leads to the conclusion that all forms of self-expression are worthy of 
equivalent protection. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish an ar-
gument from self-expression as an argument for freedom of speech 
from an argument from self-expression as an argument for liberty in 
general. 
The same conclusion follows if we focus not on the self-expression 
of the speaker, but rather on the self-fu1fillment or self-realization of 
the speaker or listener-on the ways that speaking or listening to 
speech makes one a better, or fuller, or more satisfied, or more perfect 
person.40 Again, I have no doubt that speech does indeed serve all of 
these functions. Yet once again there seems no reason to believe that 
communication serves these functions any better or more often than do 
non-communicative activities. For some people, self-realization lies in 
their occupation, their travels, their inner contemplation, or their fam-
ily life. Communication, whether one is speaker or listener, is merely 
one of a myriad of activities that in some way promotes self-fu1fillment 
or self-realization. 
In the form just presented, therefore, the theories under discussion 
37 In one sense, of course, all actions are communicative, or at least those actions that are in 
one way or another perceived by someone else. But in this sense Pike's Peak, the Empire State 
Building, and a 1957 Ford are all communicative, for all can inspire thoughts in a viewer. But 
comprehending the notion of free speech will be even more hopeless than it already is unless we 
assume a specific intention by a human being to communicate some message to another human 
being. Even this may not help very much, but that is probably because of the pervasive difficulty 
that I suggest at the very end of this Article. 
38 E.g., Baker, supra note 35; Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral 
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). 
39 For a fuller elaboration of this point, see F. ScHAUER, supra note 2, at 50-52. 
40 E.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 6-7; Redish, supra note 29. 
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provide the ideal vehicle for discussing whether it is necessary for a 
satisfactory theory of the first amendment that speech be in some way 
special. For under these theories and their variants, speech is not 
claimed to be special, or significantly distinguishable from the other 
activities that may also contribute to the value that provides the basis of 
the theory. If it is necessary to a satisfactory theory of the first amend-
ment that some such distinguishing feature be provided, then all of 
these theories must be considered to be failures. 
II 
The locus classicus of objections to self-development theories is a 
paragraph in an article by Robert Bork41 in which Bork scrutinizes the 
claimed benefits from speech of "development of individual faculties 
and the achievement of pleasure."42 He finds both of these justifica-
tions wanting for precisely the reason that I am discussing here: 
[T]he important point is that these benefits do not distinguish speech from 
any other human activity. An individual may develop his faculties or 
derive pleasure from trading on the stock market, following his profession 
as a river port pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity, 
playing tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors. 
Speech with only the first two benefits can be preferred to other activities 
only by ranking forms of personal gratification. These functions or bene-
fits of speech are, therefore, to the principled judge, indistinguishable 
from the functions or benefits of all other human activity. He cannot, on 
neutral grounds, choose to protect speech that has only these functions 
more than he protects any other claimed freedom.43 
This argument draws its significance from the fact that the first 
amendment protects speech more than it protects non-speech con-
duct.44 Without this contrast the first amendment serves no function. 
To the extent that the argument from self-development in all of its 
41 Bork, supra note 33. Expressing sympathy with part of Bork's article, as I am about to do in 
the text, runs a great risk of confusion, owing to the fact that Bork's article contains an enormous 
number of highly contested points of constitutional theory. For a taste of the dispute, see, e.g. , 
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). I find guilt by association quite deplorable in aca-
demic discourse, but let me make it clear that I do not mean to be taken as dealing with or 
expressing sympathy with any of Bork's theory except the particular point quoted below. 
42 Bork, supra note 33, at 25. This is Bork's characterization of the first two of the four values 
underlying free speech as set forth by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Whitney was later overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 449 (1969). 
43 Bork, supra note 33, at 25. The references to the "principled judge" and "neutral grounds" 
relate to Bork's full theory of constitutional adjudication and are not under discussion here. See 
supra note 41. 
44 I use "non-speech conduct" to refer to activities not covered by the first amendment. The 
contrast between the amount of protection given within the first amendment and that given 
outside it is nowhere presented more clearly than in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 
(1973). 
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forms collapses into an argument for general liberty, then no argument 
has been presented for a principle of free speech that is stronger than a 
general principle of personal liberty. Because in American constitu-
tional doctrine we protect personal liberty only by application of the 
minimal scrutiny of the rational basis standard,45 a justification that 
fails to distinguish the activities protected by the stringent standard of 
the first amendment from the activities protected by the minimal scru-
tiny of the rational basis test has failed in its task of explaining the 
protection of freedom of speech under the first amendment. 
III 
Now that I have presented the issue, I want to step away from the 
Constitution for a moment. Thus, I will first consider the argument 
against self-development as a question of social and political philoso-
phy, completely divorced from any questions about American law in 
general or the first amendment in particular. This will provide the ap- · 
propriate background for then turning to the argument as a question 
under the first amendment. I consider the two questions to be separate, 
and therefore consider them separately, because there is a point in hav-
ing a written, authoritative constitution. Moreover, the authoritative 
nature of a written constitution makes it possible that an answer gener-
ated by ideal political theory will be unsupportable in the constitu-
tional text, and indeed possibly even inconsistent with it.46 In these 
cases, it is the duty of the judge to refrain from doing what is foreclosed 
by the text, even if that judge's own view of ideal political theory might 
lead to the opposite result.47 
As a question of social and political philosophy, the argument 
against the adoption of the self-development principle is premised on a 
point about the nature of moral and practical reason. If a specific prin-
ciple is generated by a broader principle, and if we accept the broader 
principle, then we must, at the risk of self-contradiction, accept every 
other specific principle also generated by the broader principle, unless 
we can give particular and articulated reasons for drawing a distinc-
tion.48 If we accept X, and if X generates a, b, and c, then we must be 
45 E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (per curiam); Hollenbaugh v. 
Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
46 I am here presupposing a by no means uncontroversial point of constitutional theory, but 
this is not the place to present a full theory of constitutional adjudication. For the constitutional 
theory that (in part) undergirds the views presented here, see Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional 
Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982). 
47 See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981). See also J. ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
48 For a more extensive discussion, see F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 3-12. 
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willing, if we are to act rationally, to accept a, b, and c, and not just the 
one or two of those that happen to strike our fancy at the moment. 
In the context ofthe principle of freedom of speech, then, ifwe say 
that we value free speech because it is a form of self-development, and 
if we accept self-development as a given, then, if we have not justified 
any qualification, we must be willing to protect every form of self-de-
velopment as much as we protect speech. Yet many forms of self-devel-
opment, as I am using that term, can cause harm to other individuals or 
to society in general. It would be implausible to suppose that the state 
is or could be significantly disabled to prevent harms merely because 
the cause of those harms was, in the process, engaged in self-expres-
sion, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Thus we acknowledge that, in 
general, the prevention of harm is a proper function of the state, re-
gardless of how nice the causing of harm may make someone feel. 
But if speech is merely one category within the larger universe of 
self-developing actions, then it would seem, again to be consistent, that 
we would have to accept the principle that speech may be restricted 
when it causes harm to others. Yet then what is the point of a principle 
of free speech? Many communicative acts, including many that our 
pre-theoretical understanding of the nature of free speech would lead 
us to want to protect, have the capacity for causing significant harm to 
others or to society in general. Indeed, if I may return to American 
constitutional law for a moment, it is hard to think of any first amend-
ment case in which the communicative acts at issue did not cause some 
degree of harm, or at least offense.49 The anguish caused by the Nazis 
in Skokie,so the offense and annoyance of Cohen's jacket51 and 
Cantwell's phonograph,52 the damage to Damron's reputation and ca-
reer, 53 the economic losses of even the innocent merchants of Claiborne 
49 Offense now seems to have settled in as a recognized harm under the first amendment. E.g., 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). Nevertheless, the question of whether offense should be treated as a cognizable harm 
under the first amendment is by no means beyond dispute. Compare Feinberg, Pornography and 
the Criminal Law, 40 U. P1rr. L. REv. 567 (1979) with Schauer, Response: Pornography and the 
First Amendment, 40 U. PllT. L. REv. 605 (1979). 
The very fact that we can still debate about offense in the first amendment context under-
scores the point in the text, because there is no question that, outside of the first amendment 
context, a large variety of actions that are merely offensive can be controlled by government. 
Even though some may argue that offense is still far too often used as an improper basis for 
governmental regulation, e.g., D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW (1982), there is 
still no question that offensive smells can be regulated, and so too in general can unsightly build-
ings, etc. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
50 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
916 (1978). 
51 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
52 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
53 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971). 
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County,54 the distortion of the election process by money or misleading 
promises,55 and the humiliation caused by publicity about the victim 
of a sex offense56 are but a small sample of instances in which the prin-
ciple of freedom of speech is understood to prevent the government 
from intervening to deal with the kinds of harm that are normally 
taken to be sufficient to justify use of the state's coercive powers. 
Thus, we want to protect speech not because it causes no harm, but 
despite the harm it may cause. 57 Our search for a justification, there-
fore, is a search for a reason to distinguish speech from the entire range 
of intentional actions. This is exactly the distinction that the various 
arguments from self-development fail to provide. As a result, these ar-
guments tell us why we should protect liberty in general, but in the 
process they also become arguments for giving speech no greater pro-
tection than that given to the full range of other intentional actions. As 
a question of social and political theory, therefore, the arguments from 
self-development fail to provide a reason for recognizing a principle 
that grants greater protection for speech against state intervention than 
it grants to anything else the individual might wish to do. 
IV 
Let us now tum from abstract political theory, and attempt to look 
at this question as one arising in the attempt to formulate a theory of 
this58 Constitution's first amendment. In order to do this, we must rely 
on the notion of principled adjudication. Unfortunately, however, the 
idea of principled adjudication, or of neutral principles, 59 has been the 
subject of so much redefinition and misinterpretation that I would like 
to use an alternative term, confessing in the process that this term 
merely reflects an idea already well-established in the literature,60 if 
only one is willing to wade through all the drivel.61 
54 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
55 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 
290 (1981). 
56 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
57 See Schauer, supra note 49. 
58 See Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpfol Contributions of Special The-
ories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983). 
59 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). See 
also Bork, supra note 33. The notion, in some form or another, has made its way into the jargon 
of the Supreme Court. E.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a broadside attack, see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid 
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
60 See Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 35 
(1963); Greenawalt, The Enduring Sign!ficance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 982 
(1978). 
61 Unfortunately, I do not have the nerve to supply references for the characterization made in 
the text. 
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Thus, I want to refer to the notion of articulate consistency. 62 This 
term is designed to emphasize that we are dealing with a question of 
consistency and not of the rightness or wrongness of principles, and 
that the particular notion at issue is largely controlled by the way that a 
court chooses to articulate its reasons for a decision. The constraint of 
articulate consistency suggests that when we justify a decision by refer-
ence to a principle (or a reason, rule, standard, justification, or theory) 
we must be willing to apply the principle, as articulated in the first 
decision, to all cases coming within the verbal description of that prin-
ciple. When a court provides, without qualification, a reason for its 
decision, it must be willing to apply that reason in future cases, absent 
particularly strong reasons to the contrary.63 The key feature of articu-
late consistency is the way in which it is normatively neutral, or proce-
dural. The requirements of articulate consistency can apply to good 
reasons, bad reasons, or reasons totally unjustified by the judicial role. 
If a court sticks to what it says, if it is willing to take seriously its own 
statements, 64 then it has satisfied the requirements of articulate consis-
tency. And this is no less true if the original reasons or justifications 
are wrong, outrageous, or whatever. 
We can see, therefore, that the court in the first case has a great 
deal of control over how much of a constraint the notion of articulate 
consistency is going to be. If the court in the first case justifies its deci-
sion by a very narrow principle, festooned with caveats, qualifications, 
and exceptions, then it is unlikely that the constraint of articulate con-
sistency will be a significant barrier to what the court decides to do in 
the next case.65 On the other hand, if the court in the first case justifies 
its decision by a broad and generally unqualified principle, then the 
62 After imagining that I was the first to use this term, I discovered that it had been used 
previously by Ronald Dworkin. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 88 (1977). My use is 
quite similar to his, and I have been unable to come up with an acceptable alternative, so I will 
forfeit my claim to originality, if not to independent creation. 
63 That is, most of the constraints on adjudication, including this one, are presumptive rather 
than absolute. Yet the creation of a presumption in place of a clean slate is still a significant 
change. On the less than absolute nature of the neutral principles constraint, see Greenawalt, 
supra note 60, at 1007-08. q: R. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 110·15 ("gravitational force" of 
precedent). 
64 See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979). See 
also Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REv. 
467; Monaghan, supra note 47, at 387-91; Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It 
Always Meant?, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1029 (1977); Schauer, supra note 46, at 829. For the Supreme 
Court's most recent dispute about the weight to be given to its precedents, see the various opinions 
in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). 
65 The difficulty, of course, is that a highly qualified opinion will provide little if any guidance 
to lower courts as they attempt to follow the Supreme Court. One wonders at times whether the 
Court does not pay too little attention to this "guidance" function. See Corr, Retroactivity: A 
Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L. REV. 745 (1983); Easterbrook, Ways of 
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 807-11 (1982); Schauer, Private Speech, supra note 2, 
at 217-18. 
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necessity of remaining faithful to this principle will exercise a substan-
tial constraint on future decisions. Thus, the extent to which a princi-
ple applies in future cases is controlled by the justification that the 
court has provided in the first case. 
We can now return to the principle of free speech, for it is the 
notion of articulate consistency that provides the link between the 
points made in the previous section and the same issue in the context of 
constitutional law. If a court says that it is protecting act x under the 
first amendment because x is an instance of self-expression, self-fulfill-
ment, or self-realization, and the first amendment protects self-expres-
sion, self-fulfillment, or self-realization, then the court must be willing 
to apply that same principle in future cases. But since any intentional 
action can and usually is an instance of self-expression, self-fulfillment, 
or self-realization, then the constraints of articulate consistency would 
require the court to protect all intentional actions under the first 
amendment. The court, to be consistent, must be willing to apply the 
reason given in the first case to subsequent cases fitting within the 
description of the principle. If the principle is described merely as self-
expression, then the first amendment must protect all self-expressive 
actions. Yet of course it is not true that all self-expressive actions are 
protected by the first amendment, 66 or even by any other part of the 
Constitution.67 Thus, the problem with the entire range of self-devel-
opment justifications for the first amendment is that they fail the test of 
articulate consistency. Without more, they offer a rationale that is far 
broader than we are willing to accept, which if consistently applied 
would protect almost all activities to the same extent that we protect 
certain communicative activities. Because we are unwilling to do this, 
these justifications might just as well not have been mentioned at all. A 
reason we are not willing to follow is no reason at all. 
v 
I noted in Section III that there was a point in having written and 
authoritative constitutions, or at least that an authoritative constitution 
must be taken as such. In order to be faithful to this conviction, I must 
deal with the textual response to the arguments I have just presented.68 
Thus, it is freedom of speech and press, and not freedom of liberty in 
general, that is specifically set forth in the text for special protection. 
Even if the justification would, to be fully consistent, have to be applied 
to a far wider range of cases, only part of this range is picked out by the 
constitutional text for special attention. The reason we do not apply 
the self-development arguments to their full reach is that we lack the 
66 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
67 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
68 See especially Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982). 
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constitutional mandate for so doing. Because we have that mandate in 
the case of speech, we can proceed to apply that justification in speech 
cases. The relevant distinction under this argument-what makes 
speech special-is the very fact that the constitutional text says it is. 
One might call this the argument from coincidence. Even if there 
is no good reason for treating speech specially, the text says we must, 
and that is sufficient to justify the special protection for speech. And to 
the extent that the text is clear, we cannot legitimately avoid it. Thus, 
there may be no completely justifiable reason for limiting the presi-
dency to those thirty-five years old or older,69 or for giving equal repre-
sentation in the Senate to Delaware and California,70 but these are the 
mandates from the text, so we follow them. And so too, picking out 
speech for special treatment is the mandate from the text, and that's 
that. Speech is special by stipulation, even though now the stipulation 
may seem a bit odd. 
But this loses sight of why we are looking at justifications at all. 
The very reason we are concerned about the underlying theoretical jus-
tification for the principle of freedom of speech, in a way that we are 
not with respect to the age of the presidency and equal representation 
in the Senate,71 is that the text is not clear,72 and we are therefore re-
quired to work out a theory of free speech so that we can intelligently 
apply the vague words of the document.73 The argument from coinci-
dence is therefore circular. It calls upon us to note the presence of 
speech and not action in general in the text, but it is the very unclarity 
of the text that is the impetus for the entire enterprise. If we assume we 
cannot have a literal interpretation of the first amendment,74 then we 
69 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; U.S. CoNST. art. 5. 
71 It is incorrect to say that we are not concerned about justifications for, say, the age require-
ment because the issues do not arise. The very reason they do not arise is that the text is clear. If 
article II specified merely that the President had to be of "sufficient maturity", there would be 
frequently litigated controversies over that phrase (unless it was deemed a political question), and 
consequent great concern with underlying purpose and theory. 
72 For many years those sympathetic to a strong first amendment were influenced by the view 
of Justice Black that the first amendment was plain and unequivocal. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 
(1959) (Black, J., concurring); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). 
Fortunately, we have now been released from the shackles of literalism, and we understand the 
way in which the text of the first amendment is importantly vague. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Speech 
and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645, 731; Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review o/ the Free 
Speech Clause, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 107, 110-28 (1982). See also Schauer, Categories,supra note 2, 
at 267-68; Schauer, supra note 28, at 902-05. An intriguing analysis is found in Note, The Speech 
and Press Clauses t?fthe First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 81 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1973). 
73 Obviously, my reference to ''working out a theory" presupposes an approach that treats the 
free speech and other similar constitutional clauses as more or less discrete units of analysis, and, 
more importantly, places no great weight on the specific or general intentions of the drafters. See 
Schauer, supra note 46. 
74 This assumption can take two forms. First, it can be a conclusion from the vague and 
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must interpret it in light of some underlying purpose or theory. But if 
that underlying theory says nothing in particular about speech, if it 
does not set speech apart from a vast range of other conduct, then there 
is no principled stopping point after we leave the domain of what is 
very specifically and unequivocally mentioned in the text. To put it 
bluntly, the argument from coincidence might support applying the 
first amendment to all self-expressive or self-fulfilling instances of 
speech (taken literally) or press (taken literally), but the argument is of 
no assistance if we are trying to figure out why or how to apply the first 
amendment to oil paintings and handwritten manuscripts but not to 
nude bathing or riding a motorcycle without a safety helmet.75 
VI 
I now want to consider an alternative response to the argument 
equivocal language of the text. See supra note 72. See also J. ELY, supra note 47, at 105; Mendel-
son, supra note 9, at 821. On the other hand, it can also flow from what Professor Van Alstyne 
calls the "irresistable counterexample." Van Alstyne, supra note 72, at 113. Even if the language 
were both literal and absolute, which it clearly is not, it is inconceivable that certain "speech" 
activities, whether perjury, price-fixing, extortion, ordinary solicitation to ordinary crimes, face-to-
face fraud, or the making of representations about securities, could be considered exempt from 
governmental regulation. This latter approach can be characterized as "The Constitution does not 
mean what it says." The former can be characterized as ''The Constitution means what it says, 
but it says less than you think." In terms of general fidelity to the notion of a written, authorita-
tive, constitution, this last-mentioned approach has significant advantages. Fortunately, it is also 
justified by the text. 
75 Another possibility, of course, is to take the references to "speech" and "press" as little 
more than quaint anachronisms, and then proceed to use the first amendment as the vehicle for 
protecting an enormous range of individual, non-communicative conduct. See Baker, supra note 
35, at 964. Less explicit hints at the same perspective are in L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 938-90. 
Tribe refers to the first amendment throughout his discussion of various forms of expression of 
"personhood," but he is rarely explicit about which constitutional provision protects which activ-
ity. 
Apart from the difficulties I have with treating the constitutional text so casually, there is still 
the more important problem of justifying an exemption for speech in those circumstances in which 
it causes a clear harm. Suppose we change the facts of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964), slightly. That is, suppose that the authors of the advertisement, negligently and errone-
ously but in good faith, charged in the advertisement that Sullivan had served two years in jail for 
embezzlement. Suppose as well that as a result of this Sullivan loses the next election, cannot get 
another job, and winds up on the steps of the Salvation Army as a derelict. Clearly there are some 
intervening causes here, but it is also plain that the negligent and erroneous but not intentional 
falsity has served as a "but for'' cause of Sullivan's downfall. In these circumstances the New 
York Times and the authors of the advertisement would still prevail under the rule of New York 
Times. But would we be comfortable if someone's non-communicative and non-political but self-
expressive embodiment of their personhood negligently caused an equivalent harm? I think not, 
and I think we would have no problem in wanting to impose liability. I wculd imagine, for 
example, that many motorcyclists not only feel that they can better express their personhood with-
out a helmet than with one, but also that they can better express their personhood at eighty miles 
an hour than at fifty-five. Are they responsible for the harms they negligently cause when riding 
at eighty? I hope so. Are newspapers responsible for negligently causing harms of the same mag-
nitude? No. See Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971). 
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that we must reject self-development justifications for freedom of 
speech because they do not set speech apart from the entire range of 
intentional actions. Under this alternative response, presented at one 
time or another by several of the participants in this Symposium,76 
there might be reasons why speech relating to or causing self-expres-
sion, self-fulfillment, or self-realization might be more important than 
other forms of conduct relating to or causing self-expression, self-ful-
fillment, or self-realization.77 Alternatively, there might be greater dan-
ger in regulating the communicative aspects of, say, self-expression 
than in regulating the non-communicative aspects of self-expression.78 
I have no desire whatsoever to refute any of these arguments, be-
cause these arguments, unlike the argument from coincidence, ac-
knowledge the very point at issue. Indeed, they do more than 
acknowledge it, they concede it; for the qualifications about speech be-
ing a more important form of self-expression, or about the regulation of 
speech-related self-expression being particularly dangerous, are conces-
sions of the very point under dispute. If there is some reason to treat 
self-expressive speech differently from other forms of self-expressive 
activities (and the same would apply to activities that foster self-fulfill-
ment or self-realization), then that reason becomes part of the underly-
ing theoretical justification for the first amendment. In other words, a 
reason has just been given for treating speech specially. 
When we combine a general justification, such as self-expression, 
with a specifically articulated qualification, as in the arguments now 
being discussed, the underlying justification for the principle of free-
dom of speech might be complex rather than simple. This, of course, is 
not in itself a problem. Indeed, general justifications are likely to be-
come so general that they are of little if any assistance in helping us to 
decide actual cases.79 Nevertheless, if we are to use this more complex 
underlying theory to help us reach a decision in a hard case, we must 
use the entire justification and not only part of it. That is, we would 
have to look not only for the presence or absence of self-development 
factors, but also for the presence or absence of those factors that lead us 
to treat speech as a particularly important and special subset of self-
development in general. 
For my own part, I happen to believe that if we look closely at 
these distinguishing factors, we will find sufficient dangers in govern-
76 Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 734 n.344; Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory 
and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1983); Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 1238-39. Perry's 
"epistemic value" seems responsive to some of the concerns I am expressing, but I question 
whether the response is successful. In other words, is the epistemic value sufficiently different 
from or narrower than the various self-realization values so that it does not present the same 
problems I am raising here? 
77 Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 734 n.344. 
78 /d. 
79 For a fuller discussion, see Schauer, supra note ll, at 311-12. 
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ment regulation of a wide range of communication-dangers different 
in kind and degree from government regulation of other activities-to 
justify a principle of freedom of speech without having to resort to no-
tions of self-expression, self-fulfillm.ent, or self-realization. To me the 
dangers of excess governmental regulation are a self-sufficient justifica-
tion.80 I may be wrong in this. The point, however, is that if some such 
reason is either self-sufficient or supplementary, it is still a reason for 
treating speech specially. 
VII 
Although the foregoing discussion has taken place in the context 
of self-development values that are argued to provide the foundations 
for the principle of free speech, the self-development justification is of-
fered merely as an example of the larger question of the extent to which 
speech is or must be special. When I claim that a principle of free 
speech is "independent,"81 therefore, I am not claiming that the princi-
ple is or can be entirely self-standing. Nor do I claim that free speech is 
an end in itself,82 or an ultimate, irreducible value, although I do be-
lieve that ultimate irreducible values exist. 83 Thus, free speech, perhaps 
because it is so counter-intuitive84 in protecting a wide panoply of 
80 F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 80-86. 
81 Id at 3-7. See Perry, supra note 76, at 1154 n.72. 
82 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 880 
(1963). There is an unfortunate tendency to say that everything that is valued for non-utilitarian 
or anti-utilitarian reasons is a "good in itself." Yet such a statement confuses utilitarianism with 
any talk of causes and conditions. That is, there may be certain primary personal goods, perhaps 
such as autonomy and liberty. It may also be that a certain deontological, anti-utilitarian theory 
holds that individual liberty and autonomy should be protected even at the expense of the general 
public welfare. It also may be that certain conditions, such as freedom of speech, are conducive to 
autonomy and liberty. In these circumstances it would be erroneous to say that free speech is a 
"good in itself," because it is good for what it does, or what it leads to, and not what it is. It is 
possible that free speech may under some theories be a component of a primary good such as 
liberty or autonomy, and in this case we would be more warranted in saying that it was a good in 
itself. Nevertheless, the point is that speech or free speech can be merely instrumental with respect 
to certain individual primary goods, and still be a component of an anti-utilitarian theory. 
83 See I. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL EsSAYS (1978); Williams, Eth-
ical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166 (1973). Thus, I have considerable sympathy for 
what Rawls refers to as "intuitionism." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971). See Fein-
berg, Rawls and Intuitionism, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF 
JusTICE 108 (N. Daniels ed. 1975). 
84 See Emerson, supra note 82, at 887-900. Because Emerson's distinction between expression 
and action has not stood the tests of either time or close scrutiny, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 30, 
at 579, 598-601; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing 
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Yacavone, Emerson's Distinction, 6 
CoNN. L. REv. 49 (1973), there is an unfortunate tendency to discount the remainder of his contri-
butions to free speech theory. But we should not allow the sneers of the contemporary cogno-
scente to distract us from recognizing Emerson's profoundly important insights regarding the 
counter-intuitive nature of the principles of free speech, and the importance of designing not only 
principles, but institutions, to accomodate and compensate for this factor. Unless we recognize, as 
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harmful and obnoxious activities, must especially be justified by refer-
ence to some other, presumably more fundamental, principle or 
principles. 
When we engage in the process of searching for these more funda-
mental principles, we must, as I have argued,85 be willing to accept all 
of the conclusions that follow from acceptance of the more fundamen-
tal principle, or provide some distinction between speech and the other 
activities generated by the principle. If we justify free speech by refer-
ence to a principle of democracy, 86 or some broader principle or 
scheme of politicalliberty,87 for example, then we must be willing to 
accept not only a principle of free speech, but also those other more 
specific principles that follow from a general principle of democracy or 
political liberty. In fact we do precisely that, because we protect voting 
and other activities related to the process of government as strongly as 
we protect freedom of speech, 88 albeit in different ways and with differ-
ent doctrines. An argument based on democracy, therefore, even with-
out any further qualifications, satisfies the constraint of articulate 
consistency in a way that an argument from self-expression simpliciter 
does not. 
Thus, we cannot distinguish free speech, or speech itself, from all 
other activities. That is undoubtedly impossible. 89 It nevertheless re-
mains crucial that we treat freedom of speech as being independent 
from general liberty, because of two interrelated problems. First, we 
want to protect speech more than we protect many other activities that 
are part of some conception of general liberty. For example, we want 
to protect speech more than we protect economic activity, although 
under some theories economic activity is an important and perhaps 
even central part of liberty in general. 90 We also want to protect free 
speech more than we want to protect a wide range of non-communica-
Emerson has forced us to do, that freedom of speech is a fragile value, and one whose protection is 
likely to focus on the crackpots and ideological dregs who are the most common litigants in first 
amendment cases, we will make little progress in designing doctrines and institutions sufficient to 
the task. 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
86 E.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 33; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The 
Central Meaning o/ the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191. See also Brennan, The 
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation o/ the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1965). 
87 See Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN 
VALUES 1 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982). 
88 In some instances we do so by explicit textual commitment. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. 
XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. In other instances we use interpretation of broader constitutional 
provisions. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). At times we construct entire theories. 
E.g., J. ELY, supra note 47. 
89 See Perry, supra note 76, at 1185. 
90 E.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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tive lifestyle choices, although once again these choices are to some an 
important component of liberty in general.91 The second point, insepa-
rable from the first, is that we are unwilling to disable ourselves from 
dealing with harmful, offensive, obnoxious, dangerous behavior in gen-
eral in the way that we are with reference to speech. 
Thus there exists in current free speech doctrine a difference in 
both the type and probability of harms that will justify government 
intervention. Harms that are sufficient outside the coverage of the first 
amendment are non-cognizable within the coverage of the first amend-
ment; and even with respect to harms that are entitled to consideration 
both inside and outside the first amendment, the first amendment re-
quires a likelihood of harm much higher than we otherwise require.92 
It is this difference that is in need of theoretical justification, at least as 
we continue to contemplate broadening the first amendment, and thus 
it is important to see why speech might be special with respect to gen-
eral liberty. Fortunately, this is an easier task than trying to see if 
speech is special simpliciter, but that does not mean that we have al-
ready achieved success. 
VIII 
In searching for an underlying theoretical justification for the prin-
ciple of freedom of speech, it is possible that we will find a number of 
different justifications. Although some theories are indeed unitary,93 
and although there need not be anything inherently wrong with a uni-
tary theory, so, too, there need not be anything wrong with a multi-
valued theory. 
When I refer to a multi-valued theory of the first amendment, I am 
actually including two different types of multi-valued theories. One 
type views the language of the free speech and free press clauses of the 
first amendment as the umbrella under which are located a number of 
more or less distinct separate principles, each with its own justification, 
and each directed towards a separate group of problems. Under such a 
view, for which I acknowledge considerable sympathy,94 we might in 
fact have several first amendments. We might have one first amend-
ment directed primarily to the problem of government suppression of 
its critics. The justifications for this first amendment might be largely 
of the democratic theory95 and abuse of governmental power96 vari~ 
91 See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978). 
92 Compare the standard of likelihood in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(per 
curiam), with the ''unprovable assumption" theme in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 
(1973). 
93 E.g., Perry, supra note 76; Redish, Free Speech, supra note 29. 
94 See Schauer, supra note 11, at 313. 
95 See supra note 33. 
96 See supra note 34. 
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eties, and this first amendment might be the one that is most applicable 
to cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sul!ivan,97 NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co.,98 and United States v. Grace,99 just to take one famous 
and two recent examples. Another first amendment might be directed 
primarily towards the problem of open inquiry in the sciences and at 
academic institutions, being based primarily on the heritage of Galileo 
and the search for truth/marketplace of ideas justifications for the prin-
ciple of free speech.100 Perhaps this is the first amendment, albeit with 
some overlap with the one mentioned previously, that lurks around 
cases such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire 101 and Board of Education~ Is-
land Trees Free Union School .District v. Pico .102 A third first amend-
ment might be a reaction to an excess of historical censorship of the 
arts, 103 leading to cases such as Southeastern Promotions~ Ltd v. Con-
rad104 and Jenkins v. Georgia, 105 and perhaps even based in part on 
notions of self-realization. This list of possible first amendments is of 
course representative rather than exhaustive, but I think I have made 
the point. 
Alternatively, the other variety of multi-valued theory might say 
that speech represents a unique mix of various different characteristics, 
not duplicated in other human endeavors.106 This unique mix of self-
expression, self-realization, capacity for influencing political change, 
and so on, is then said to justify special protection for speech. This is 
by no means an implausible view, but it seems somewhat sticky in ap-
plication, at least at the margin. That is, what do we do when we are 
unsure of first amendment coverage in a close case? I suspect that here 
it would be futile to inquire into whether this instance presents the 
same kind of unique mix of characteristics that justifies the special pro-
97 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
98 458 u.s. 886 (1982). 
99 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983). 
100 See supra note 32. 
101 354 U.S. 234 (1957). I pick Sweezy because it concerns speech in the classroom, albeit indi-
rectly, but still in contrast with all of the supposed "academic freedom" cases that in fact involve 
merely the free speech rights of public employees, on their own time, some of whom coinciden-
tally happen to be teachers. See Schauer, Private Speech, supra note 2, at 242-49. These issues 
were raised but ultimately not decided in Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (per 
curiam) (dismissing appeal for mootness, lack of standing, and absence of article III jurisdiction). 
102 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
103 I use "historical" not in the sense of a problem that was perceived as significant by the 
framers, or even at that time, but rather in the sense of a problem that the Court has perceived as 
having been a problem in the past. Thus, the rigidity of current standards for obscenity, Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Pinkus v. United States, 
436 U.S. 293 (1978), is likely a reaction to the extremes of the nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth centuries, and not to problems identified as such, or even existing, in the eighteenth 
century. 
104 420 u.s. 546 (1975). 
105 418 u.s. 153 (1974). 
106 E.g., Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 1238-39. 
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tection of speech. 107 Rather, we would look at the particular compo-
nents of that mix that were present in the case at hand, and when that 
happens this second type of multi-valued theory collapses into the first. 
IX 
Earlier I drew the distinction between abstract political theory and 
constitutional interpretation.108 Although it is a hotly contested point of 
constitutional theory, 109 at least all of the participants in this Sympo-
sium subscribe to the view that the development of constitutional prin-
ciples need not be based solely on the dictionary definition of the words 
in the text, 110 nor on the specific understandings of those who drafted 
the provisions at issue. Thus, the task of the courts, in attempting to 
interpret the open-ended and morally loaded constitutional provi-
sions-freedom of speech, equal protection, cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and so on-is to develop a theory of these clauses, a theory that 
will be significantly philosophical but will include a large dose of 
precedent. 111 
When we are engaged in theory construction in this sense, we can 
proceed in alternative ways. One approach is to attempt to work out an 
ideal political theory independent of the particular constitutional provi-
sion at issue, such as freedom of speech, and then proceed to apply that 
clause to the extent that it supports that theory. I have little sympathy 
for this approach, in large part because its chief analytical tool seems to 
be the shoehorn. To the extent that the text does not fit the precon-
ceived theory, then a little pushing and pulling, huffing and puffing, 
bending and slicing, and-voila-one's preconstructed political theory 
just happens to be embodied in the Constitution, with nothing left 
out.II2 
An alternative approach, and one much more consistent with my 
vision of constitutionalism, is one that starts with the particular clause 
as the mandate for building a narrow theory of that clause. We start 
with freedom of speech, for example, because freedom of speech is 
107 It is possible, of course, that we might create a rule based on a certain general mix of 
characteristics, and then, like most rules, apply it more or less mechanically without determining 
whether this particular instance does or does not fit the underlying theory of the rule. That per-
ception, however, does not apply to this inquiry, in which, by stipulation, we are dealing with 
those close instances that require that we go beneath the surface of the rule. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
109 See Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic 17zeory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); Judi-
cial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Judicial Review and the Constitution 17ze 
Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983). 
110 I use "dictionary definition" to make the statement non-trivial. Everyone purports to be 
defining the terms in the Constitution. The dispute is about where the definition comes from. 
See Schauer, supra note 28. 
Ill See Schauer, supra note 46. See also supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
112 For more extensive criticism of this approach, see Monaghan, supra note 47. 
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written down in the authoritative document, and then proceed to work 
out a theory of freedom of speech. Under this approach we accept the 
presupposition that speech is special, because the text imposes that pre-
supposition on us. Then we try as hard as we can to derive an underly-
ing theory that is consistent with the textual presupposition. It is this 
process that I have implicitly described throughout this Article. We are 
required to accept the view that the Constitution gives speech and press 
special protection, that in close cases we must develop an underlying 
theory of the first amendment, and that this underlying theory must be 
consistent with, and preferably supportive of, the special protection for 
speech given by the document. It is in this sense that I maintain that 
speech must be special. 
X 
There is an intellectual ache in all of this, and it may be shared by 
many people now engaged in the process of trying to explore the theo-
retical foundations of the principle of freedom of speech. As we reject 
many of the classical platitudes about freedom of speech and engage in 
somewhat more rigorous analysis, trying to discover why speech-po-
tentially harmful and dangerous, often offensive, and the instrument of 
evil as often as of good-should be treated as it is, our intuitions about 
the value of free speech, solid as they may be, are difficult to reconcile 
with this analysis. The ache, it seems to me, is caused by the fact that 
although the answer to "Must speech be special?" is probably "Yes," 
the answer to "Is speech special?" is probably "No." Reconciling this 
inconsistency is the agenda we cannot avoid. 
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